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Good-enough Principles for Welfare
FIONA WILLIAMS* 
ABSTRACT
The aim of this article is to widen the grounds of the debate on the rela-
tionship between values, social change and welfare reform. In the public
debate on welfare reform and the Third Way the significance of the welfare
politics and campaigns of civil society in challenging the old welfare order
has received little acknowledgement. The article argues that these politics
and campaigns have, along with both the New Right and New Labour,
attempted to construct a new vision of an ‘active welfare subject’. In the
process they have also expanded the moral repertoire for understanding
people’s engagement with welfare beyond the self-interest/altruism
dichotomy. The article uses this new repertoire to propose seven key 
principles for a reordering of the social relations of welfare.
I N T RO D U C T I O N
Welfare states in the industrialised West are in transition. The social, 
economic, political and cultural conditions which sustained a post-war
welfare settlement in many Western countries have changed. In Britain,
the contours of a new welfare order are being shaped by new political 
discourses and by competing interpretations of the social and economic
risks we face and how we defend ourselves against them. New definitions
of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship and of the rights and
wrongs of egalitarianism are emerging.
In addition, the imbrication of academic and political debates on 
welfare in Britain is more marked than it has been for three decades
(Giddens, 1994, 1998a, b; Etzioni, 1997; Franklin, 1997; Le Grand,
1998). Underlying different contributions to the debate is an attempt to
etch out the principles or values which would both underpin, and be rein-
forced by, a new welfare settlement. In this way, welfare resettlement and
moral reordering can be seen to be proceeding hand-in-hand. Before
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being elected in January 1997, Tony Blair made this connection clear by
insisting that the key question was not ‘whether the welfare state is
reformed’ but ‘by whom and with what values the new settlement on
welfare is underpinned’ (quoted in Deacon, 1998, p. 307). This state-
ment directly echoes questions raised by Tony Giddens some three years
earlier: ‘If it is to be agreed that there is still an agenda for radical politics,
who is to implement it? Seemingly even more difficult: what values might
provide guidance for such an agenda?’ (Giddens, 1994, p. 20).
In answering these questions about who should lead the welfare settle-
ment, and with which and whose values should it be informed, it has
become commonplace in the debate to identify three key political actors
and their sets of values (see Giddens, 1998b; HMSO, 1998a, pp. 2,
19–22): (1) social democracy (Old Labour/Old Left); (2) neo-liberalism (New
Right); and (3) the Third Way (centre-left/ New Labour). However, the repre-
sentation of the post-1960s politics of welfare in these terms is circum-
scribed and tends to eclipse the diverse and complex ways in which the
post-war welfare settlement was destabilised. Also, by distilling the chal-
lenges to the ancien welfare regime down to the New Right and New
Labour, it tends to cast as unreconstructed ‘Old Labour’ those who might
seek to support or, at least to make more transparent, issues of redistribu-
tion and universalism. Because it limits an understanding of ‘the politi-
cal’ to formal party politics it only tacitly acknowledges the significance
of those political energies in civil society which have centred upon forms
of welfare activity or activism since the late 1960s. These refer not only to
‘new social movements’ (around gender, race and ethnicity, sexuality, dis-
ability and age) but also to the plethora of campaigning organisations
and self-help groups which developed to stake claims for welfare (around,
for example health needs, care needs and responsibilities), as claimants of
benefits (e.g., carers, pensioners), as users of particular services – (for
example, psychiatric services, maternity services, and so on) or as
providers of alternative services (refuges, support systems for people with
AIDS) (Williams, 1989; Taylor, 1993; Oliver, 1996; Beresford and Turner,
1997; NCVO, 1997, Hoggett, 1997). In this article I argue that while
these political and ‘subpolitical’ activities do not and have not constituted
a homogeneous movement, nevertheless, together they contributed as
profound a political critique of the post-war welfare state as those from the
New Right and New Labour. They have put on the agenda needs to do
with personhood and well-being which have expanded the moral reper-
toire for understanding people’s engagement with welfare, and have
widened the meanings of redistribution, equality, universalism and justice
(Williams, 1989; Lister, 1997). Their claims have also highlighted a 
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cultural political problem, that is, whether it is possible to combine a
commitment to universalism in policies whilst respecting a diversity of
identities, practices and beliefs. And, if so, on what basis can solidarities 
of support for a new welfare order be built from claims of difference?
I begin by contextualising these campaigns and activities within 
competing and overlapping contestations of the post-war settlement
which has emerged in Britain over the last twenty years. Three main dis-
courses are identified: the New Right, New Labour and the new social
and welfare movements. These are analysed in terms of their common
concern to create, albeit in different ways, an active welfare subject
within new organisational relations of welfare, and their different con-
structions of the moral motivations of this welfare subject – self-interest,
altruism and the recognition of equal moral worth. The last of these is
used to develop a tentative framework of principles for the social relations
of welfare.1
C H A N G I N G T H E W E L FA R E S U B J E C T
The challenges to the so-called consensus supporting the post-war
Keynesian welfare settlement came thick and fast in a variety of forms:
economic recession, the ‘unfixing’ of gender and ethnic relations,
changes in the organisation and provision of employment, demographic
shifts, challenges to the sovereignty of the nation-state. They fed into
political challenges to the welfare state which emerged during the 1970s
and which focused upon the nature of its key organisational characteris-
tics – mass/universal, state provided, bureaucratically run and profes-
sionally-delivered. The challenges came from both neoliberal critiques of
the welfare state’s efficiency and from progressive critiques of its univer-
salism and accountability developed from the new forms of political col-
lectivities on the left – originally from the social movements based in
inequalities of gender, race, disability and sexuality, but later also from
groups organised around specific welfare rights and needs.
What began to emerge were new contesting discourses of welfare
which, in very different ways, focused upon the reconstitution of the 
welfare subject as an active element in the social relations of welfare,
rather than the passive recipient of (benevolent or controlling) welfare.
This shift from passive to active welfare subject has been observed by oth-
ers in different terms (Titterton, 1992; Deacon, 1993; LeGrand, 1997;
Leisering and Walker, 1998; Williams et al., 1999). Le Grand (1997), for
example, ties it into an analysis of different views of the motivations of
welfare subjects and notes a distinction in the consensus period between
the passive recipients of welfare (the ‘pawns’) and active welfare subjects
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in the shape of altruistic taxpayers, administrators and professionals
(‘knights’ as Le Grand calls them). Le Grand describes how policy
changes in the 1980s, especially in quasi-markets, reconstituted fiscal
and other welfare providers and users as active in the pursuit of their indi-
vidual self-interest (the ‘knaves’). He acknowledges that motivations may
be more complex than those of either ‘knight’ or ‘knave’ (see also
Edwards and Duncan, 1997; Taylor-Gooby, 1998), however, the point I
explore later is whether this dichotomy of altruism/self-interest provides
a broad enough moral grammar to understand (collective) agency and
action around welfare.
The New Right
Much has been already documented on the way neoliberalism constructed
and implemented a shift from a bureaucratic-professional welfare regime to
a managerialist one tightly controlled by the centralised state, but organisa-
tionally dispersed through the creation of the three Ms – markets, man-
agers and mixed economies (see Hills, 1990; Clarke and Newman, 1997).
This shift was not unique to Britain, but has taken place in many Western
industrialised welfare states albeit coloured in different political hues. The
hue of neoliberal politics within Britain constructed major risks most cen-
trally in terms of the accumulation needs of capital (a shift to flexible labour
and a low wage economy) and the moral risks to the nation. It did this
through a populist political programme which redefined the welfare state,
not as a source of protection from risk, but as itself a major generator of risks
– of disincentives to initiative, of welfare dependency, of an underclass, of
inefficiency and expense in the public sector, and, thereby, of loss of eco-
nomic competitiveness in the outside world. Through neo-conservatism it
sought to protect the nation from these risks by asserting a moral and social
order that reinforced traditional social relations of family and nation in the
pursuit of individual self-interest, family self-reliance, discipline and the
transmission of ‘British’ cultural values. In terms of the social relations of
welfare, its version of markets, managers and mixed economies reconsti-
tuted the welfare subjects into two main opposing categories: the tax-
payer/consumer and the welfare dependant. The taxpayer/ consumer sub-
ject was constructed as responsible but overburdened, straining to exercise
choice in the welfare market. These new dividing lines resonated with gen-
dered, racialised, aged and able-bodied divisions, but in common with 
New Labour and the new social movements discussed below, one of the 
fundamental breaks it made was to recreate the valid welfare subject as
active, as possessing self-interested agency and autonomy in relation to the
market.
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New Labour’s New Contract for Welfare
This focus upon the active welfare citizen as against the passive welfare
beneficiary of Beveridge’s day is one of the central ways in which New
Labour inscribes the welfare subject a place in the New Contract for
Welfare, its Green Paper on welfare reform (HMSO, 1998a).2 The new active
welfare subject is described variously as being a ‘citizen’, a ‘customer’, ‘a self-
supporting person’, a ‘stakeholder’, a ‘consumer’, a ‘voter’ and ‘an indi-
vidual with duties’. These last three are rolled into the ‘demanding, scep-
tical citizen-consumer’ (ibid., p.16). This slippage in terms partly signifies
the attempt to draw on different discourses in order to mark out a new
way. It also represents a ‘tiering’ of welfare subjects – a far more subtle
and less fixed approach compared with the New Right’s consumer-
taxpayer versus welfare dependant – and consisting of one central subject
and two types of decentred subject. In the centre is the sceptical citizen-
consumer who acts in the pursuit of ‘enlightened self-interest’ (Deacon,
1998, p. 311), expecting value for money and quality services tailored to
individual needs. To either side of the sceptical consumer are, first, the duti-
less and, second, the dutiful and vulnerable with a line around the second
group being more tightly drawn – no longer to include, for example, lone
parents or all disabled people. Each group has different objectives: ‘Work for
those who can: security for those who cannot’ (HMSOa, 1998 p. iii). Paid
work will enable – or empower – the dutiless to enact the duties at the heart
of the contract – to be in paid work, to be independent, to support the family,
to save for retirement and not to defraud the taxpayer (ibid., p. 80). The
third tier of welfare subjects consists of those for whom paid work as the
means of escaping poverty and dependence is not an option: ‘those who are
retired or so sick or disabled, or so heavily engaged in caring activities, that
they cannot realistically support themselves (ibid., p. 23, my emphasis). For
them ‘dignity and security’ is promised (ibid., p. 19).
The social relations of the new welfare programme adds a further ‘M’
to (quasi) markets, managers and mixed economies and this is ‘modern’.
A modern service, like its customers (who are at the centre – not the end
– of service delivery) is active in its efficiency, its support, its transparency,
in tailoring its service to individual needs, in its use of information tech-
nology to co-ordinate the different sectors; it will also reclaim and
reshape an ethos of public service (ibid., pp. 6, 71–78, 81). 
New Labour aims to tackle three central problems or risks: inequality
and social exclusion; welfare dependency and disincentives to paid work;
and benefit fraud. These are relatively low-level risks compared with the
post-war and New Right projects, but where the Green Paper is quiet on
risks it is much more assertive in terms of morality and values, and in the
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creation of a new moral order. Moral imperatives are tied into financial
imperatives through the central ethic of paid work. Where the principle of
the market was central to the New Right’s agenda, the principle of paid
work articulates New Labour’s agenda. It is the first duty of citizenship,
rather than one of its central rights (with the exception of disabled people
for whom it is both a duty and a right). Parents in paid work (both moth-
ers and fathers) provide a good role model for their children and social
networks for themselves (HMSOa, 1998, p. 58). Paid work, then, is what
we owe our government, our country, our families, our communities and
ourselves. ‘Community’ here signifies the ‘social’: that which connects
the individual and his/her family to the nation-state and work. It is the
vehicle for greater opportunities in the pursuit of both self-interest and
altruism, and the glue which binds an inclusive society together. In this
way welfare subjects are seen as both self-interested and altruistic.3
This view of human agency remains confined within social democratic
and liberal paradigms rather than seeking to go beyond them. At the
same time, however, some of the issues around equality and citizenship
raised by, amongst others, new social movements and user groups
(Beresford and Turner, 1997), and discussed in the following section, do
find some reflection in the Green Paper – for example, that welfare should
support independence, that disabled people should have civil rights; that
a minimum wage should act as a barrier against the poverty trap; that
services should be flexible, accessible, transparent and universally of high
quality; and that users should be consulted. However, much of the gist of
what has constituted an ‘alternative’ discourse on universalism and
equality finds little reflection in policy documents. Similarly, Tony Blair’s
Fabian pamphlet on The Third Way (Blair, 1998) reiterates the view that
‘Human nature is co-operative as well as competitive, selfless as well as
self-interested’ (ibid., p. 4) whilst also promoting ‘equal worth’ as one of
four key values for a strong society. Equal worth is defined as the need for
anti-discriminatory policies, the value of a multiracial society, and the
significance of rights-based campaigns, yet these are scarcely elaborated
in any of the priorities in the rest of the pamphlet. If it is only at a rhetori-
cal level that New Labour recognises the equal worth of all citizens, then
what does the principle of equal worth mean in relation to welfare? And
is the conception of the welfare subject as both knightish and knavish a
sufficient moral basis for understanding the pursuit of equal worth?
The new politics of welfare
Since the 1970s campaigns by new social movements and by welfare
users exposed, first, the limitations of a ‘false’ universalism, a limited 
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egalitarianism and an exclusive rather than inclusive citizenship inherent
in the post-war welfare state (Williams, 1989; Hughes and Lewis, 1998).
In doing this they also highlighted new social risks – for example, domes-
tic violence, racial violence, forms of discrimination, child sexual abuse,
lack of autonomy, rights circumscribed according to sexual preference,
environmental risks from pollution. The identification of these risks
emerged from claims against cultural and social injustices caught up in
unequal relations of power in society. These relations were refracted in
welfare through the hierarchical relations between providers and users,
through the constitution of moral categories of desert and medical cate-
gories of physical, mental and sexual invalidity, and through forms of
restricted access to resources by marginalised social groups. Thus, cen-
tral to many of their demands has been the reconstitution of the welfare
subject as an active citizen participating in the democratic organisation
of welfare services.
It is important to acknowledge the diversity of the sorts of campaigns
and groups identified at the beginning of this article (see, for example,
Oliver, 1990 for a typology of disability action groups). While their poli-
tics have been particularist in the sense of staking out specific needs, they
are nevertheless marked by a generality which is about more than the
redistribution of goods. This centres upon claims for the realisation of 
personhood, for cultural respect, autonomy and dignity. Furthermore,
neither altruism nor self-interest can capture the mainspring behind
demands that welfare services respect identity and autonomy and treat
people with ‘equal worth’ (see, for example, the ‘charters’ from groups
involved in community care in Bornat et al., 1997, pp. 266–97).
A more fruitful approach is provided by the philosophical theories and
discussions of what has been termed ‘the politics of recognition’ by Axel
Honneth (1996), Charles Taylor (1994) and Nancy Fraser (1995). All
three note that struggles to assert their equal moral worth by subaltern,
marginalised and excluded groups increasingly characterise the politics
of identity and new social movements and signify an attempt to reject the
systematic disrespecting or misrecognition of a group’s ‘culture or way of
life, the dignity of their status as persons, and the inviolability of their
physical integrity’ (Anderson, 1996, p. x). According to Taylor, ‘Due
recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need’
(1994, p. 26).
In different ways Taylor and Honneth trace historically the material
and philosophical development of struggles for recognition. Honneth’s
exposition, which draws on Hegel and Mead, proposes that the precondi-
tions for self-realisation are rooted in the struggle to establish mutual
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recognition (rather than in the struggle for existence). Crucially, however,
mutual recognition is relational, or dialogic; personal identity depends
upon social relationships to develop and sustain it. Honneth identifies
three modes which make this possible: close relationships of love and
friendship which grant self-confidence; legally institutionalised relations
for the development of rights, granting self-respect; and, third, networks
or communities of shared values which provide an individual with a
sense of worth and self-esteem. In terms of the political, his theory takes
us beyond rights as the basis for self-realisation and into the moral land-
scape of social conflicts over worth, and also beyond the idea that ‘inter-
ests’ alone fuel collective action:
The motives for rebellion, protest and resistance have generally been transformed into
categories of ‘interest’ and these interests are supposed to emerge from the objective
inequalities in the distribution of material opportunities, without ever being linked, in any
way, to the everyday web of moral feelings. (Honneth, 1996, p. 161)
Taylor (1994) also provides a historical analysis of the significance of
recognition struggles for contemporary politics and the dilemmas they
pose. Briefly, he describes how, from the eighteenth century, the collapse
of social hierarchies with fixed statuses derived from the ‘natural’ order
and its replacement with a democratic ideal led, on the one hand, to 
universalist politics which emphasised the equal dignity of all, and, on
the other, to the development of a modern notion of identity.
Furthermore, the greater the questioning of the preordained, the more
numerous the struggles for the recognition of previously excluded identi-
ties/groups (for example, women, minorities). However, the universalis-
ing logic of the first process pulls against the particularising logic of the
second. The attempt to resolve this tension requires, in Taylor’s terms, a
continual reassessment of our horizons of taken-for-grantedness; and, in
Honneth’s, an examination of the moral grammar of social conflicts. In
this way Honneth and Taylor provide a further understanding for human
action rooted in the need for the mutual recognition of one’s own or one’s
group’s moral worth.
What follows is a tentative attempt to outline a framework of princi-
ples, drawing upon welfare struggles and campaigns, which extends 
the moral vocabulary of the social relations of welfare beyond the self-
interest/altruism dichotomy. It is intended as the basis for discussion,
amendment and empirical investigation,4 and also to put flesh on the
bony rhetoric of ‘equal worth’ in the Third Way debate. It follows a mode
of ‘thought-experiment’ used in other disciplines (Held, 1995; Fraser,
1997). 
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First, two points should be made. Nancy Fraser’s contribution to the
debate on recognition struggles (1995) insists on the importance of
acknowledging issues of redistribution. She therefore talks about the poli-
tics of redistribution and recognition, saying an egalitarian society cannot
have one without the other. I agree with this position. Indeed, welfare
struggles in Britain demonstrate par excellence that struggles for recogni-
tion almost inevitably involve some aspect of redistribution. This applies
to the principles that follow. They have to be seen as part of, not an alter-
native to, a commitment to meeting people’s needs for a basic income,
employment, health care, housing and education. As such they address
the social, cultural and political elements of the settlement, but this 
does not mean that they are separate from the issues of how to pay for
welfare (see Hills, 1993)5. They should also be seen as reflective of the
claims emerging within a specific time and place – they lay no claim to be
universal.
The second point is that I have suggested in my title that these are
‘good-enough’ principles. The term is drawn from the psychoanalyst
Donald Winnicott’s attempt to explore the good-enough conditions of
intersubjectivity for the socialisation of young children. Honneth uses
Winnicott’s (amongst others’) findings for developing his theory of the
struggle for recognition at the level of love and friendship (see earlier). My
use of ‘good-enough’ indicates a morality grounded in the relational con-
ditions of everyday life sufficient for the recognition of moral worth (cf.
Smart and Neale, 1997). I have transposed both ‘good-enough’ and
‘recognition’ to the sphere of welfare politics in order to identify a moral
grammar of welfare ‘from below’. I am also proposing that we need to
understand welfare systems not only as the institutionalisation of social
rights but as part of the ‘networks and communities of value’ which we
inhabit, through which some of our needs for ‘due recognition’ might be
met.
G O O D-E N O U G H P R I N C I P L E S F O R W E L FA R E
Interdependence
The discourse of dependency has become the focus for both resistance and
disapprobation. An example of dependency as resistance discourse is the
1970s Campaign for the Legal and Financial Independence for Women
which was established to challenge women’s dependent status in relation
to social security rights, taxation, tenancies, mortgages, bank accounts
and so on (McIntosh, 1981). Another example is the Independent Living
Movement developed from local campaigns by disabled people in the
1980s (Morris, 1993). Central to both these campaigns was a challenge
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to the way welfare institutions, policies and professionals construct 
certain social groups as dependent – that is, unable to exercise autonomy
in certain areas of their lives. The construction of women as financially
dependent on their husbands not only limited their access to certain 
benefits it also captured their assumed subordinacy to their husbands in
relation to other areas of personal relationships – in decision-making, in
relation to sexual relationships or spending power. For disabled people,
their dependency was constructed as a grateful passivity upon those rela-
tives or professionals who ‘looked after’ them. Their institutionalisation
often represented, as it did for older people, the stripping of autonomy and
privacy and an exclusion from social life. In contrast, the Independent
Living Movement seeks independence for disabled people in daily lives, in
achieving mobility, in parenting, in pursuing paid work, in living in
places and with others of their own choice (Priestley, 1999).
Dependency, as constructed through the institutions of welfare, affects
different groups in different ways, but ‘dependency’ also has different
political constructions (Drover and Kerans, 1993, ch. 1; Fraser and
Gordon, 1995; Leonard, 1997, pp. 50–4). Over the last ten years forms of
moral disapprobation have developed attached to the notion of ‘welfare
dependency’ – an imagined culture that has developed into a deviant
underclass (Murray, 1990). In this scenario dependency is seen as a 
condition resulting from the receipt of benefits and is, in New Labour’s
version, counterposed to empowerment and independence through paid
work in the market. This narrowing of the notion of independence as
market-based, and of the notion of dependency as behavioural rather
than enforced or resisted, has served to obscure the struggles against
dependency of those whose routes to labour market freedom, or economic
independence, are more risky and tortuous – women with children, dis-
abled people, chronically ill, and older people. Indeed, welfare benefits and
services have provided for women, disabled and older people the means of
escape from the undesirable dependency upon oppressive relationships.
Furthermore, it is ironic that those who are claiming welfare are seen
as dependent, no matter how fully engaged or responsible for others they
may be, whilst those who are market dependent are seen as independent.
Contemporary discourse also labels lone mothers who prefer to stay at
home to look after their children as welfare dependants whereas their
married counterparts are seen as exercising choice. But this dichotomy
which contrasts the extra-market dependant on the one side and the fully
integrated paid worker on the other fails to recognise that this worker’s
independence is achieved through hidden systems of support upon those
who care for that worker’s children, clean his/her house, buy and cook
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his/her food, and so on. Personal autonomy is only achieved through 
collective effort. 
Rather than promoting the dependency/independence dichotomy, we
could propose interdependence as the principle which brings into play all
those emotional, material, physical networks of unequal reciprocity, and
creates the basis for autonomy. We need to accept that we are all necessar-
ily dependent on others, but at the same time challenge the institutions,
structures and social relations which render some groups unnecessarily
dependent. This connects to the second principle: that of care.
Care
One important way in which welfare states construct a boundary
between public rights and responsibilities and private duties is the extent
to which they recognise, remunerate or socialise the work involved in
caring for and/or supporting children, older frail or sick people, people
who are disabled and require support, for, on the whole, this has been
assumed to be the unpaid responsibility of women in the home. In the
1960s and 1970s women’s demands focused upon improving child-care
support facilities for women to enable them to work and this was followed
by an attempt to get women’s caring of older and/or sick and/or disabled
family members recognised. All of this was a radical departure from the
post-war welfare settlement in which informal care was an invisible and
taken-for-granted area of welfare (Land and Rose, 1985). 
Local carers’ groups and carers’ organisations, and later a National
Carers’ Organisation, campaigned over the rights for women to benefits
for caring responsibilities, especially for married women who had been
denied (until 1986 when it was challenged by the European Court) a care
allowance on the basis of it being part of a married women’s natural duty.
More research revealed the extent to which caring responsibilities involve
financial, emotional and physical costs to women (Finch and Groves,
1983). And, as more claims were made, women had to confront the 
difficult issue of whether by demanding a wage for carers they would 
simply reinforce the idea that caring is a woman’s work. Alternative – or
concomitant – strategies have included demanding, or creating, the 
conditions for men to share caring responsibilities (indeed, many men do
take on caring responsibilities for their disabled wives – Parker, 1993). 
Another solution is what has been called the ‘residential route’ (Finch,
1984). However, this strategy has been profoundly problematic for people
requiring support. Care may assume duty and responsibility, it may
involve love and commitment, but, as disabled people have pointed out,
the focus upon care and the notion of care as unvalued and oppressive
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labour obscures the fact that caring is also a relationship which may
involve unequal relations of power between the carer and the cared-for
person. The principle of care requires us not only to heed the needs and
interests of the carer but also the needs and interests of the cared-for 
person. People who require support have demanded the choice as to who
cares for them, where and how. For many disabled people, the very con-
cept of ‘care’ cannot be disentangled from a notion of dependency; it sits
uneasily with a view of empowerment which leads to choice and control
(Morris, 1993). One of the strategies to enable disabled people to pursue
independent lives has been the demand for direct payments – that is, for
disabled people to receive cash payments in order to employ carers of
their own choice and to determine the type of support and assistance
they require.
‘Care’ then requires recognition but also careful negotiation of the dif-
ferent interests caught up in its discourse and practice. Care suggests
duty, responsibility, obligation, power, control, oppression, conflict, altru-
ism, love, solidarity and reciprocity. We all at some time care and are
cared for. Importantly, the attention to care that different groups and
campaigns have brought provides us with a grounded set of ethics with
which to balance the twentieth-century preoccupation with the ethic of
paid work at the centre of our values, duties and rights. The ethic of care
assumes relationships which are bound by mutual interdependence. Its
practice involves the values of attentiveness, responsiveness, competence
and responsibility, negotiation and mutual recognition.6 This means that
it is through caring and being cared for that we take account of the needs
of others, not in an abstract way but in terms of their specific contexts,
and this provides a grounding for the civic virtues of responsibility, toler-
ance and an awareness of ‘otherness’, of diversity and competing claims.
For this reason, the values of care need to inform concepts of citizenship:
they involve concepts to do with responsibilities and relationships and
they can engender practices of moral deliberation and dialogue grounded
in everyday activities (see Tronto, 1993; Sevenhuijsen, 1998). It is the
boundaries of these concepts of care to which we turn next: intimacy
Intimacy
The care relationship is often but not always an intimate one; the inti-
mate relationship is usually, but not always, a relationship of care. The
intimate sphere covers relationships based upon mutual exchange of love
based upon family ties (parenting, marriage, kinship), friendship, sexual
relationships, as well as paid care relationships, and it is undergoing sig-
nificant change. A number of key shifts have been identified in the ways
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we understand intimate relationships: they are less about duty and more
about mutually agreed commitment; they are less about achieving status
and more about negotiating an identity; they are less about authority and
obedience and more about consent; they are less about tradition and
more about trust; they are less about honour and more about respect
(Giddens, 1992; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995). However, to identify
these shifts in emphasis is not the same as saying that this is what char-
acterises intimate relationships (Jamieson, 1998; Smart and Neale,
1999). Nevertheless, the aspiration that relationships can and should be
more democratic reflects a response to the questioning of unequal gender
relations which emerged from the women’s movement. The pursuit of
claims for women’s autonomy in terms of rights to earn a wage, to expect
help with household duties, to claim fair shares on divorce, to leave rela-
tionships where power was abused, have all influenced the democratisa-
tion of relationships both between men and women and between mothers
and fathers and children. Women’s debunking of patriarchal authority
has also partly contributed to a greater understanding of children as
active subjects.
It is not simply a detraditionalisation and democratisation of gender
and parent-child relations which has influenced these shifts. The greater
concern for the mutuality of relationships rather than their convention-
ality reflects the campaigns by gay and lesbian movements to gain recog-
nition, rights and respect. The freedom to chose one’s sexual partner, to
have that relationship respected and to have access to the rights of 
heterosexual couples (joint tenancies, pensions, custody, parenting and
so on) have been part of these movements’ claims (Carabine, 1996).
Whilst on the one hand there has been pressure on the state to recog-
nise diversity of form in intimate relationships, there has also been pres-
sure on the state to intervene to protect the vulnerable who are victims of
violence and abuse in intimate relationships. Campaigns against child
sexual abuse, domestic violence and sexual abuse of disabled children and
adults and older people in institutional and residential care has charac-
terised an approach to intimacy which places much higher value upon
the quality of personal relationships and personal autonomy and empow-
erment within relationships, and which recognises the potential for the
abuse of power in unequal relationships. Connected to these issues is the
fourth principle: that of bodily integrity.
Bodily Integrity
The history of welfare interventions is, in part, the history of the iden-
tification and classification of healthy/productive and unhealthy/unpro-
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ductive bodies and fit and unfit minds (Foucault, 1965, 1973). The power
of the professions of medicine, social work and education to observe and
assess the body and the mind required the physical surrendering by
patients of their bodies as well as the surrendering of their own knowl-
edge about their bodies. However, from the 1960s a wide range of cam-
paigns began to resist this.
Campaigns by women for reproductive rights – over contraception,
abortion, infertility treatment, medical treatment in childbirth; cam-
paigns against ECT treatment; campaigns by older people in residential
homes for the right to look after their own medications; campaigns
against racial violence and abuse on housing associations, in communi-
ties by the police; campaigns against rape, sexual violence and abuse;
campaigns against corporal punishment in schools and homes; cam-
paigns against the rise of ‘virginity tests’ by immigration officials on
young Asian women migrants; campaigns to grant the right of asylum to
rape victims; campaigns against sex trafficking and sex tourism and child
prostitution; campaigns to ‘normalise’ disabled and different bodies – all
of these centre upon the right of the individual to protect his/her body
against external or internal risk. The body is a site of control, resistance
and pleasure; it is inscribed with the social relations of power in which it
exists. The title of the famous health care manual ‘Our Bodies, Ourselves’
(Phillips and Rakusen, 1978) reflects the way in which our bodies mark
the physical boundaries of our sense of self, our own dignity and self-
respect. In these terms, respect for the integrity of the body is fundamen-
tal to the maintenance of the autonomy of the welfare citizen. With the
demystification of professional knowledge and techniques, this is also the
prerequisite of any policy which encourages people to maintain their own
bodies as healthy.
Identity
Earlier I suggested that due recognition of identity, as both a sense of self
and a sense of belonging, offered a vital way for understanding individual
struggles for self-realisation and collective struggles by subaltern groups
against disrespect. David Taylor has outlined the significance of these two
aspects of identity – which he calls ontological (sense of self) and categori-
cal (sense of belonging) – for the social relations of welfare (Taylor, 1998).
He argues that by exploring how ‘individuals build up a sense of coher-
ence through their multiple identifications’ we can ‘understand the way
in which individuals form attachments to social movements and enter
into political agency – in this case around struggles for welfare’ (p. 341).
At the same time, ‘categories of identity act back upon their incumbents,
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often inscribing ontological characteristics to their members’ and in this
way ‘identity categories become inscribed in welfare discourse, position-
ing their subjects with ascribed characteristics.’ (pp. 341–2). It is possible
to see these processes at work in the recent history of welfare, each
demonstrating the significance of a proper respect for identity in the prac-
tice of welfare. 
In relation to ethnicity, the migrants who came to Britain after the
Second World War were mainly Commonwealth citizens who, formally at
least, had access to the social rights of welfare. However, restrictive crite-
ria of eligibility, such as length of residence, prevented access to public
housing, and lack of information, language barriers, lack of respect for
different cultural practices led to a denial of their rights. The assumption
was that those of different ethnic backgrounds would assimilate. In prac-
tice, the material conditions of these groups’ existence, such as mothers
engaged in paid employment or restricted residential areas, were fed back
as negative culturally ascribed characteristics. The subsequent struggles
around health care, education, community and social care, were about
both claiming cultural respect as well as the redistribution of rights and
goods. Ultimately they were challenging Britain to come to terms with
itself as a culturally and racially diverse society. 
However, there are problems with notions of cultural and ethnic diver-
sity. First, a notion of diversity can obscure the fact that ethnic groups
may be hierarchically positioned and not simply living in harmony
together. Campaigns by black mental heath groups to challenge the
incarceration of disproportionate numbers of young men in prisons and
mental hospitals were a challenge to racist stereotyping of Afro-Caribbean
cultures rather than simply a demand for cultural diversity. The very fact
that the word ‘ethnic’ commonly refers to minority ethnic groups suggests
that those of white English ethnicity can take their ethnicity so much for
granted that they do not have to reflect upon or define their own ethnicity.
Second, tolerance of cultural diversity may ignore differences within those
ethnic groups – of class, gender, sexuality or age. Third, cultural/ethnic
categories may be imposed upon groups in static or essentialist ways that
ignore the fact that time and place reconfigure and hybridise cultural/
ethnic identities. Indeed, this kind of essentialism can give rise to a justifica-
tion for separatism – they have their schools, we have ours – but without
shifting the relations of domination and subordination between different
ethnic groups. 
Welfare systems also create identity categories for their subjects and
these too have become the focus for resistance. For example, disabled 
people have grasped hold of the administrative/medical category of 
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‘disabled’ and turned it into a political identity of enactment and empow-
erment.
Given this history, New Labour’s appeal to family, community and
nation as the bases of solidarity and support may be insufficient. The
identities which create forms of belonging, solidarity, resistance and 
support for groups may be multiple, may cut across, indeed, may recon-
stitute the very meanings of, family, community and nation.
Transnational Welfare
If multiculturalism disrupts the homogeneity of national identity, then
the redrawing of nation-state boundaries disrupts nationality – the prin-
ciple at the very heart of eligibility to welfare – and creates one of the
biggest challenges to twenty-first-century welfare societies. The assump-
tion of the twentieth century has been that our access to civil and social
rights is bounded by national/territorial/geographical boundaries. What
we have seen over the last ten years is the redrawing of national and
administrative boundaries, processes of devolution as well as the creation
of supranational boundaries such as the EU, and the increase in people,
especially women, crossing those boundaries as migrants, refugees and
asylum seekers. In many European countries migrants have limited
access to social, civil and political rights yet they are part of a political
economy which depends upon their labour. Furthermore, in those wel-
fare systems which perpetuate the use of nationality as one of the criteria
of eligibility to social rights, their denial of social rights to those racialised
‘others’ who are not nationals, is commonplace, as is the scapegoating of
those groups as ‘scroungers’. The racialisation of welfare politics has
become more pronounced in many Western and Eastern European coun-
tries in recent years (Faist, 1995). One of the areas in which this has
manifest itself in Britain is in the withdrawal of rights to cash benefits and
social housing to asylum seekers.
However, the transnationalism in markets, corporations, agencies and
political institutions has also been matched by transnationalism in social
movements, especially in their capacity to forge international links at
grass-roots levels. This is also reflected in the growth of global confer-
ences, (such as women’s conference in Beijing in 1994), the growing 
significance of NGOs as political actors and mediators, and the interna-
tionalisation of anti-poverty strategies of organisations such as Oxfam,
which now focuses on strategic alliances between poor communities in
the North and the South (Bronstein 1998). One example at the EU level is
an organisation of ‘Black and Migrant Women’ which has been cam-
paigning within the European Women’s Lobby since 1992 for, amongst
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other things, independent legal status for black and migrant women, 
distinct from their partners and fathers; emergency provisions for women
who are subject to domestic and other violence, and a recognition of the
specific discriminations and abuses experienced by women applying in
asylum legislation (EWL, 1995, pp. 255–57; Williams, 1997). How far
the EU reinforces nationalisms by conflating citizenship with white
Europeanness or moves towards a multiethnic, post-national citizenship
(Delanty, 1995) will affect the possibilities for meeting the welfare needs
of those most affected by changing boundaries and globalisation.
Voice
This final principle runs through each of the other principles discussed.
Underpinning the challenge to users as dependent subjects, the interro-
gation of the care relationship, the assertion of diverse and democratic
forms of intimacy, the recognition and respect of bodily identity and cul-
tural diversity and the questioning of nationality as a basis to rights, is an
assertion that the experience of the users of welfare services and their
own definition of their needs is central to the organisation and delivery of
welfare services. At the same time, the proliferation of self-help groups is
testimony to the claim that people themselves can develop and share
their own forms of knowledge and care. What this challenges is the power
of expert knowledge to monopolise the definition of what is wrong with
us and what we need to right it. It demands a democratising of the rela-
tionship between users and providers both collectively and individually
and a sharing of expert and lay knowledges.
This suggests a different interpretation of the active welfare subject. 
The New Right envisaged a new power to welfare users as consumers in
the welfare market exercising their choice. But this offered the power
largely through exit. It left untouched the relations between the providers
and users of welfare. However, the new managerialism ushered in by the
New Right brought with it a commitment to consult with user groups,
which, in areas in which those groups are strong, provided a space for
collective voices to be heard. New Labour has reinforced this managerial-
ist approach to the assessment of a diversity of individualised needs,
whilst also, in places, acknowledging the importance of users to have
access to expert knowledges (see Our Healthier Nation, HMSO, 1998b).
However, where citizens/consumers become active and empowered is less
in the articulation of these needs, than in the exercising of duties and
responsibilities to themselves, family, community, taxpayer and state. The
social movements have focused more directly upon the democratisation
of provider-user relations as the site for the pursuit of active citizenship.
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In this situation needs are individual, but, in so far as they result from
forms of social differentiation that are shared, they are also collective needs.
It is on this basis that users may collectively have more say and thereby
influence the relations of power between individual providers and users.
This version of active citizenship depends upon a radical and pluralist
notion of democracy which can both account for and address the com-
peting claims from different groups. Some have called this ‘the politics of
a differentiated universalism’ in which universalism is the commitment
to an equal moral value of all and inclusion of all, and its differentiation
reflects people’s own definitions of their diversity, but challenges the
structured differentiation which renders some groups unequal and/or
excluded (Young, 1990; Mouffe, 1992; Lister, 1997). The political strate-
gies for pursuing this depend upon developing solidarities based upon the
respect of difference: not the solidarity of the lowest common denomina-
tor, nor the solidarity that presumes all will forgo their particularities in a
common goal, rather it is the pursuit of unity in dialogues of difference.7
Such a politics also has to involve both the redistribution of goods and the
mutual recognition of worth. If groups simply pursue the politics of
recognition without addressing socioeconomic inequalities, then they
will win social justice for some in their group, but not for others. On the
other hand, the singular pursuit of issues of economic inequality can 
render invisible cultural injustices which render some groups more 
vulnerable to economic exploitation (Fraser, 1995).
C O N C L U S I O N
We are caught up in major social, economic and political transformations
in which a new welfare order is emerging. But what values will inform
this new order? I have argued that a common theme in the debate is that
of the active welfare subject, and suggested that there are three competing,
but overlapping, claims to this from the New Right, New Labour and the
new social welfare movements. Each invokes different meanings of
‘active’, from exercising choice in the welfare market, the pursuit of paid
work with responsibilities to family and community, to the active articu-
lation of welfare needs. In addition, the moral motivations ascribed to
these activities vary. While the first two are largely confined to the self-
interest/altruism dichotomy, the third goes beyond this to identify the
pursuit of the recognition of equal moral worth which, I suggested, char-
acterises welfare campaigns by new social movements and user groups.
Developing from this I proposed a framework of ‘equal worth’ principles
for the reordering of the social relations of welfare. These constitute the
welfare subject a little differently from the actor in pursuit of enlightened
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self-interest whose moral frailties are constrained by duties, incentives or
penalties, or else enhanced by altruistic acts. Here is a welfare subject
whose identities are sustained through interdependence, through striv-
ing for the mutual recognition of worth and a tolerance of diversity, and
whose capacity for self-interested action is mediated through bonds of
belonging and meanings of identity and structured by local, national and
international relations of power and inequality. This welfare subject is
motivated to articulate and redefine their welfare needs by the expectation
that welfare can provide some of the conditions for the realisation of mutual
security, dignity and respect. These include counterbalancing the ethic of
paid work with a commitment to the ethics of care, interdependence as a
more collective basis to risk-sharing, more democratic forms of representa-
tion and dialogue with users, a respect for, and recognition of, changing
forms of identity, intimacy and bodily integrity, and commitment to a multi-
racial society within the context of supranational developments.
N O T E S
1 These principles are necessarily speculative at this point, although they are drawn from an
intellectual and often active engagement with movements and campaigns since the 1970s
(represented, e.g., in Williams, 1989, 1992, 1996). In addition, they form part of the back-
cloth to a larger ESRC research programme on Care, Values and the Future of Welfare at Leeds
University (1999–2004) and will be empirically tested in one of the research strands which
examines the values to emerge from social and welfare movements in the areas of parenting
and partnering.
2 I focus here only on the Green Paper for Welfare Reform for reasons of space and because this
spells out most clearly forms of welfare subjectivity. A not dissimilar analysis of New Labour’s
health care reforms is provided by Driver and Martell (1998).
3 For comments and critiques see Lister, 1998, Levitas, 1997, Dwyer, 1998, Macgregor, 1998,
Deacon, 1998, and for a questioning of the assumed knavishness of the taxpayer, see Taylor-
Gooby, 1998.
4 See note 1.
5 The ways in which these principles inform issues of redistribution will be elaborated in
Williams (in preparation).
6 Debates on the ‘ethics of care’ tend to privilege the virtues brought to caring by the carer; I
have tried to shift the balance here.
7 Some have used the concept of ‘transversal politics’ to signify a politics which is neither only
universalist nor only based upon diversity, recognising different perspectives but sharing a
common vocabulary of values (Yuval-Davis, 1997). Such ideas have been put into practice in
Northern Ireland – see, for example, the report of Unison/Impact Conference on Social Care
held in Belfast in 1997 (Pillinger, 1997).
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